Internal Security Review — July 2026

Remediation verified September 29, 2026 · SovereignLedger and endpoint-authentication statuses updated October 16, 2026

Security review, remediation, and controls designed and implemented by Margarita Montañez Davenport.

Scope and Method

The review covered the EncryptHealth web application and API, the public websites, the self-hosted server configuration, the software dependencies, and the smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet. Each finding was re-verified on September 28, 2026, and smart-contract access control on September 29, 2026, against the running systems: live endpoint checks, automated end-to-end tests, response headers, headless-browser policy checks on every public page, the verified source of the deployed contracts, and current dependency scans.

Open items are listed by category only. Formal third-party audit planned before mainnet.

13
Findings
8
Remediated and Verified
2
Partially Remediated
3
Remediation in Progress

Critical — 3

Endpoint authenticationRemediated · 270c3da c336866 c602ca5
Consent signature handlingRemediated · 270c3da c336866 97eae2b c110a92
Smart-contract access controlPartially remediated · 2935b0c (v3 rejects claims naming another guide; a wallet naming itself as guide is accepted) · v4 adds the participant’s EIP-712 signature; production switch planned

High — 4

Service network exposureRemediated · host configuration
Rate limitingRemediated · 1892b55
Dependency vulnerabilitiesPartially remediated · c6c0049; remediation in progress
Dependency alertsRemediation in progress

Medium — 4

Security headersRemediated · 56f6d05
Content Security PolicyRemediated · 3c2beda
Retired page routingRemediated · 1d8ba05
Remote administration exposureRemediation in progress

Low — 2

Content Security Policy allow-listRemediated · e091605
Client configuration hygieneRemediation in progress

Controls in Place

  • Authenticated consent API: grants and single-grant revocations are wallet-signed, nonce-protected, verified server-side, and stored with their signatures; revoking every grant at once runs from the participant’s signed-in session, without a separate signature; a wallet can act only on its own records (270c3da)
  • Constant-time webhook signature verification for payment settlement (67988e4)
  • On-chain record anchoring with per-record Merkle proofs on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet (84ba4e1) — MerkleAnchor 0x09f318717B44a22919Bd0B0EA445A41Ad889168c
  • Security headers on futuresystemslab.io, the evidence site and encrypthealth.io: Content Security Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy (56f6d05, 3c2beda, e091605). demo.futuresystemslab.io and clinical.futuresystemslab.io send X-Frame-Options and X-Content-Type-Options; their Content Security Policy and Permissions-Policy are not yet set.
  • Per-wallet rate limiting on token minting (1892b55)
  • Session attestation contract accepts claim registration from the owner or from the guide address named in the call — SovereignLedger v3 on the Ethereum Sepolia testnet (2935b0c) 0x0562E4BD813250C65518e911d8624A8A8415262B; SovereignLedger v4 adds the participant’s EIP-712 signature on every claim

SovereignLedger, October 13, 2026. EncryptHealth records session claims on SovereignLedger v3. On v3 the platform relay submits each claim; the contract also accepts the guide address named in the call, so any wallet can register a claim by naming itself as the guide. SovereignLedger v4, deployed and source-verified on October 13, 2026, adds the participant's own authorization. Each claim carries the participant's EIP-712 signature, which the contract verifies on-chain; the platform submits the transaction. The first v4 claim, claimId 0, was signed by a test participant wallet in a preview build. EncryptHealth moves to v4 in a planned production switch.

Formal third-party audit planned before mainnet.